2003 US-led Invasion of Iraq: The What, The Why, and the After

 One of the United States’ favorite pastimes is getting involved. In the simplest– and most colloquial wording possible- it makes everyone else’s problems its own. Often, non-consensually. 

In order to dive into the effects on regional politics of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, we must first glaze over the relevant history. 

The Build-Up

In August 1990 Iraq invaded its neighboring country Kuwait, in a quest for more oil-producing land and therefore more power. At this time Iraq was a regional power, which is arguably attributed to its highly-motivated dictator, Saddam Hussein. Hussein came into power in 1979, shortly before the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988, in which neither side truly won. 

The global response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was unprecedented. The UN Security Council declared Iraq’s invasion a violation of international law, and global powers– even Iraq’s allies– came together to oppose its control of Kuwait. 

From the tragedy of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, emerged an American effort: the War on Terror. The United States sought to eradicate all terrorist activity, particularly in the Middle East. 

The US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq was a result of building tensions. Gregory Gause, author of The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, said it best: “From 1990, the American role in the Gulf became progressively more militarized and more direct, culminating in the occupation of Iraq in 2003.” (Gause, 2010)

The Invasion

The War on Terror helped to justify the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, both morally and in the context of international law. Anti-terrorism violence was not a political action nor solely violence: it was an intentional targeting of terrorism. Or so they said. 

Before the invasion, a narrative (with little evidence) was formed within the US that Saddam Hussein was supplying Al-Qaeda with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Though other countries did not fold to this, the United States– and Britain– invaded Iraq in order to stop the sales, among other motivations. When no evidence was found that Hussein was supplying WMDs to terrorists groups, the US narrative shifted: now the invasion became about politics. 

Another major US motivation for the invasion was the spread of democracy, though it was still also a part of the War on Terror. The US was trying to set up more democracies within the Middle East, in order to gain more influence and minimize sectarianism. Another possibility is that the US was making choices under the assumption of the democratic peace theory, which states that democracies won’t fight each other, in order to reduce the overall amount of conflict in the Middle East. 

The invasion of Iraq also resulted in the removal of Saddam Hussein, a Sunni member of the Ba’athist party who had been in power for decades. 

After removing Hussein and motivated by democratization, the United States and its allies implemented an interim democratic government in Iraq. 

The Outcomes

Power Vacuum 

This Iraqi interim democratic government was set up in 2004, and in October 2005 the constitution was approved. However, infrastructures in Iraq were devastated by the invasion. Iraq went from being a powerful state in the region with a fierce dictator to a greatly weakened state, no longer a regional power. This created a power vacuum in the Middle East; Iraq’s power diminished in an instant and other states stepped in. This is key to understanding Iraq post-2003 invasion: other actors became involved to try to enforce their own political ideas, systems, agendas, etc. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and even Turkey stepped in to spread influence and power over the people of Iraq, and those throughout MENA that Iraq had influenced.

 

Sectarianism/Religious Outcomes

The involvement of other regional actors post-2003 invasion also led to more intense identity politics. The Ba’ath party was mostly Sunni, as well Hussein, so the invasion allowed for Shiites to heavily involve themselves in the post-invasion state building. Sunnis opposed this Shiite government, especially with the Ba’ath party having just been overthrown, and tensions continued to rise. Sunni tribal militias were outspoken in ‘defending’ themselves, which led to the ‘Al Qaeda in Iraq’, eventually branching off to become the jihadist Islamic state (ISIS). 

On a regional scale, the US War on Terror inadvertently helped Iran, because the country no longer had to put money and resources into protecting itself against Iraq and Saddam Hussein (and Afghanistan). Iran is a majority Shiite country, and suddenly experienced an expanse of power as it no longer had to protect itself against Hussein and the Ba'ath party’s powerful Sunni Iraq. Saudi Arabia, majorly Sunni, tried to oppose this expansion of Shiite power. The Saudi-Iran competition which really began decades before in 1979, continued to heighten. 

Here is the distribution of Shia and Sunni Muslims in the Middle East, today:

United States Involvement

The United States’ War on Terror post-9/11 greatly changed the US’ involvement in the Middle East. The War on Terror motivated the US to involve itself in all issues in MENA states, trying to chase and squash the ‘roots’ of terrorism. A narrative emerged that the Middle East was a breeding ground for terrorist groups. Middle Eastern states became relevant not only to American foreign policy, but to US domestic politics as well. Since the turning point of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, American hyper-involvement in the Middle East has continued to be a trend in global politics.

                                                                Works Cited

Gause, F. Gregory. The International Relations of the Persian Gulf. Cambridge University Press, 2010. 

Fawcett, Louise. International Relations of the Middle East. Oxford University Press, 2019. 

Haddad, Fanar. “Shia-Centric State Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7 Jan. 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/07/shia-centric-state-building-and-sunni-rejection-in-post-2003-iraq-pub-62408.

“The History of Saudi-Iranian Competition.” The History of Saudi-Iranian Competition | Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/history-saudi-iranian-competition.

Image of Desert Storm Map: https://fanack.com/wp-content/uploads/the-kuwait-crisis_iraq_gulfwar_730px_02_7358f018be/the-kuwait-crisis_iraq_gulfwar_730px_02_7358f018be.jpg

Image of American flag on tank: https://cdn.vox-cdn.com/thumbor/Qo4U-uLQhoNoYRSbzQZjBAHJspM=/0x0:3000x1952/1200x675/filters:focal(1260x736:1740x1216)/cdn.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_image/image/70887438/GettyImages-1858351.0.1484672502.0.jpg '

Image of Saddam Hussein: https://www.biography.com/.image/t_share/MTgwMzIxNzI5OTAwNDU1MDYy/gettyimages-113975611.jpg 

Image of Gulf States map: https://www.geographicguide.com/pictures/middle-east-map.jpg 

Image of Sunni/Shiite split: https://static.independent.co.uk/s3fs-public/thumbnails/image/2016/01/05/16/middle-east-divide-map.jpg?quality=75&width=982&height=726&auto=webp